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Abstract: 
The objective of our paper is to study R&D investments and pricing behavior in an 
environment with fundamental uncertainty. We designed a multi-period experiment in which 
each period consisted of two stages, an R&D phase and a pricing stage. Participants in the 
experiment had almost no information about the underlying functions, parameters, and 
probabilities. Subjects’ behavior in the fundamentally uncertain environment of our 
experiment may best be characterized as some kind of procedural rationality which we call 
quasi-rationality. Pricing decisions are particularly close to equilibrium values. Although we 
do find some hints of the existence of behavioral effects in R&D decisions, only 
reinforcement effects are significant across both treatments and different model specifications. 
The introduction of patents has only a minor impact on R&D behavior. Overall, subjects learn 
to adapt remarkably well to a rather complex and fundamentally uncertain environment. (JEL: 
C90, D81, L10, O31)  
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1. Introduction  
By the beginning of the 16th century, geometry had already been studied for about 2,000 
years. According to Alfred North Whitehead, however, “allowing for some minor 
qualifications, nothing had come from it except the intrinsic interest of the study. Then, as if a 
door had suddenly opened, Kepler produced the first important utilization of conic sections, 
the first among hundreds, Descartes and Desargues revolutionized the methods of the science, 
Newton wrote his Principia, and the modern period of civilization commenced. Apart from 
the capital of abstract ideas which had accumulated slowly during two thousand years, our 
modern life would have been impossible.” (Whitehead 1929, 74). This tiny insight from the 
history of science illustrates how difficult it is to measure the value of scientific results-even if 
the results are already known. It took almost 2,000 years to find major applications for 
geometry. How incredibly difficult, then, is anticipating the utility of research before results 
are available? Economic theory often simply assumes this problem away, as do many modern 
approaches to analyzing innovations.  
Mainstream Industrial Organization theory analyzes R&D in terms of rational choice 
models. Competition in innovation is usually modeled as a stochastic noncooperative game 
with firms calculating their optimal levels of R&D investments (Reinganum 1989). The 
corresponding models cover the entire process of innovations: there are symmetric models of 
oligopolists competing on a level playing field (e.g. Loury 1979, Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980, 
Lee & Wilde 1980); asymmetric models of an incumbent facing a potential newcomer (e.g., 
Gilbert and Newbery 1982, Katz and Shapiro 1987); models of licensing, adoption and 
diffusion of innovations (e.g., Kamien & Tauman 1984, 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1986); 
models with spillover effects and models without spillover effects; models that allow for 
R&D cooperation and models that do not (e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien, 
Mueller and Zhang 1992); one-stage models (without) and multi-stage models with 
succeeding product market competition. 
In each of these models, firms must be able to calculate the expected marginal profit of 
an increase in R&D spending ex-ante. These profits depend on the possible values of the 
targeted innovations and innovations basically consist of novel information. To assess the 
value of information, one has to know its content and the consequences that follow from the 
information. On one hand, if someone already knows the information, it is no longer novel. 
On the other hand, if one does not know the information, then one cannot calculate its value. 
This problem is known as the Arrows Information Paradox, and it also applies to innovations. 
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If one does not know the nature of an innovation and all of its characteristics, then one cannot 
derive its value. “[It] is hopeless to develop a model which will genuinely predict innovation: 
an innovation is something new, and if you know what will be in the future, you know it now” 
(Arrow 1991, 473). Furthermore, as R&D by its very nature is a search within an unknown 
terrain, researchers do not have reliable information about the probability distribution of 
different types of innovation. Consequently, researchers lack both prerequisites for calculating 
expected profits, including the possible contents of innovations and the probability of finding 
such innovations. If it is simply impossible to calculate returns on R&D investments, should 
there not be other determinants of investing than those that find their way into rational choice 
models? Our two-stage experiment tests this view.  
We want to integrate two central aspects of competitive R&D into our project. The first 
is fundamental uncertainty (i.e., the impossibility of calculating expected profits from R&D 
ex-ante). Innovation in our experiment is characterized by a near total lack of quantitative 
knowledge by our participants about innovations’ values, the probability of finding specific 
innovations and about the consequences of innovations. The second aspect we aim to cover is 
the connection of the R&D process with competition in a market for final products. Again, 
subjects are not informed about the underlying functions (i.e., the demand functions). The 
succession of two basically competitive stages (R&D and selling products in a market) also 
serves to impede the emergence of collusive behavior, leading to the creation of an 
experimental environment with somewhat industry-like characteristics.  
Our main research questions are as follows: How can R&D and pricing behavior best be 
explained? Is it best explained by measures of profitability or by behavioral variables? Can 
aspiration adaptation theory (e.g., Selten 1998) contribute to the explanation of behavior? 
Could reinforcement effects in the sense of successful R&D breeds further R&D play a larger 
role? Do patents make a difference?  
Our main finding is that subjects learn to act in our complex and fundamentally 
uncertain environment remarkably well. This is true for pricing and for R&D behavior, which 
may be described best as “quasi-rational”.  
Of course, there is a long tradition of empirical field studies on R&D that we cannot 
cover here. However, we believe it is fair to say that the results of these studies are, at best, 
mixed. There is no consensus about the impact of product market competition on R&D. 
Results range from a positive influence of competition on R&D (e.g., Beath et al. 1989, 
Geroski 1994, Nickel 1996) and an inverted-U-relation (e.g., Aghion et al. 2005) to a negative 
impact (e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). Furthermore, empirical literature suggests that 
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patents play only a minor role in determining R&D (Cohen et al. 2000). Patents seem to be 
important primarily in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries (Levin et al. 1987).  
We are aware of only a few experimental papers on competitive R&D. Isaac and 
Reynolds (1988) and Hey and Reynolds (1991) present single-period patent races that are 
closely related to theoretical models of patent races and serve as theory tests. Both papers 
confirm Nash Equilibrium predictions and the impact of appropriability concerns. Isaac and 
Reynolds (1992) extend the experiment by adding a product market stage, showing that 
competition increases R&D. Sbriglia and Hey (1994) try to find some basic behavioral 
patterns within a search game in which subjects had to determine a particular combination of 
letters out of a given set of potential combinations. This particular combination can be 
interpreted as the content of a valuable patent. Zizzo (2002) conducts an experiment with 
close reference to Harris and Vickers (1987). In this multi-stage patent race, the patent is 
given to the competitor who first wins ten rounds of stochastic R&D competitions. It shows 
that experimental behavior deviates substantially from theoretical predictions. Sacco and 
Schmutzler (2007) present a two-stage game with R&D as a deterministic investment in cost 
reductions. They have different treatments for Bertrand and Cournot competition and find 
higher R&D investment in the case of Bertrand competition. Suetens (2008) analyzes the 
effect of R&D cooperation on product market collusion. In her experiment, R&D cooperation 
facilitates collusion. Breitmoser et al. (2008) study a dynamic indefinite horizon R&D race 
with uncertainty and multiple prizes. The subjects’ behavior in different treatments is far less 
sensitive to treatments than theory predicts. In addition, investment is highest when rivals are 
close, i.e., when there is neck-to-neck competition).  
The experiment that is most similar to ours is Cantner et al. (2007), in which R&D is 
also modeled as a highly complex search process. Subjects have to design a product in eight 
dimensions. The first subject to find the optimal value of a dimension gets the corresponding 
patent for four periods. Defining the intensity of competition by the closeness of rivals, they 
find that technology leaders (those who have the better product quality) invest more as the 
intensity of the competition decreases. This result is not compatible with neck-to-neck 
competition or with a U-shape of R&D intensity with respect to competition. In contrast to 
leaders, technology followers invest more in R&D as the gap between leader and follower 
decreases (i.e., as the competition intensity increases). Overall, Cantner et al. (2007) is still 
closer to Sbriglia and Hey (1994) than they are to our paper. First, Cantner et al. do not have a 
product market stage. Second, they do not allow for a non-disclosure of R&D contents. They 
automatically give a patent to the finder of an optimal component and inform rivals about the 
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optimal value of the component. In our experiment, innovators can keep their knowledge 
secret. Finally, and most importantly, Cantner et al. design a complex and uncertain 
environment. However, success probabilities can, in principle, be calculated. In our 
experiment, we design fundamental uncertainty by not giving subjects any information about 
the distribution of product qualities. We believe that a true innovation process is characterized 
by this lack of knowledge and that our design is therefore most similar to the real innovation 
problem.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the experimental design. Our 
behavioral hypotheses are presented in section 3, and experimental results are discussed in 
section 4. Section 5 provides a conclusion.  
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment consisted of two treatments: a Basic Treatment and a Patent Treatment. The 
Basic Treatment was composed of ten periods in a two-stage duopoly with differentiated 
products. Duopolists were randomly assigned to each other at the beginning of the 
experiment. Each pair was fixed for all ten periods of a session.  
Each period consisted of two stages. In stage 1, both duopolists could conduct R&D, 
and in stage 2, they could choose their prices in a differentiated product market. R&D success 
determined the firms’ product qualities zi. A larger value of zi increased the demand for firm 
i’s product and decreased firm j’s demand to a comparatively smaller degree.  
The R&D process was designed as a search within a two-dimensional landscape (a,b), a 
 [0,100] and b  [0,100], so that there were 101101 = 10,201 combinations of a and b. 
Product quality is a function of these combinations, i.e., z = z(a,b). More precisely, the quality 
function was defined as a flat lattice with 20 cones distributed on it. The flat part of the 
landscape quality is given by z(a,b) = 0. Quality is only above zero if subjects chose a 
combination on one of the cones. In these cases, quality is given by the height of the chosen 
(a,b)-combination. The cones differed by height and radius. The only information that was 
given to the subjects was that the maximum value of quality z was 100. Subjects did not 
receive any other information so that they viewed the landscape as a black box. They also did 
not know that there were any cones that determined z or anything else about the distribution 
of z-values. Figure 1 shows the R&D landscape.  
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Figure 1: The R&D landscape  
The R&D phase lasted for two minutes each period. Within this time, subjects could choose 
(a,b)-combinations in order to find high quality levels z(a,b). Subjects could make as many 
trials as they wished. However, each trial cost 500 Experimental Points (EP). At the end of 
each R&D stage, each firm’s quality was determined by the highest z(a,b) value it had found 
during any of the previous R&D phases. Finally, both players were told their own R&D cost, 
their own quality level and their competitor’s quality level. The coordinates (a,b), however, 
remained private knowledge. Then the market phases began. 
Each market phase lasted three minutes during which both duopolists had to choose 
their product price pi  [0,600]. Without having any production costs, product market profits 
(net of R&D cost) were given by the firms’ revenues. However, subjects did not know their 
profit functions, so they had to determine prices by trial and error. To speed up this trial-and-
error-process, we provided subjects with a revenue calculator. Subjects could enter their own 
hypothetical values and their competitor’s price and were given the corresponding 
hypothetical revenues (of both players). Use of the revenue calculator was free, and subjects 
could enter as many trials as they wished. After choosing their prices, subjects were informed 
about the players’ prices, quantities, and profits. Then a new period began.  
The only difference between this Basic Treatment and the Patent Treatment was the 
possible introduction of the filing of a patent. Each player could file no more than one patent 
per period. A patent is granted for a particular (a,b)-combination. This combination and the 
other twelve nearest combinations around (a,b) were protected from the competitor’s 
imitation. Subsequent to the R&D stage, the coordinates of the patent were given to the other 
duopolist. Patent protection started in period t+1 and lasted for a total of three periods, so that 
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in period t+4, access was opened to the innovator’s rival. During the protection period, the 
patent holder has to pay 1,000 EP for each valid patent.  
Demand for firm i’s product was given by  
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i = 1,2 and i  j. Here σi denotes firm i’s number of R&D trials in the current period, and i 
denotes its number of valid patents.  
In April 2008, we conducted two sessions for each treatment at Clausthal University of 
Technology. We had 20 participants in each session.2 All subjects were students at Clausthal 
University (Business Administration, Industrial Engineering and several other engineering 
programs). The sessions lasted for about two hours. Subjects earned about 20 Euros (28 US 
Dollar in April 2008) on average. The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007).3  
3. Hypotheses  
The product market stage is designed similar to previous oligopoly experiments. However, the 
introduction of a competitive R&D stage before the market stage should lead to a more 
competitive atmosphere between the duopolists. Consequently, we hypothesized that 
participants would also behave competitively in the product market.  
Hypothesis 1: Price-setting behavior will be close to the competitive, subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game, i.e.,  
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200  , i = 1,2 and i  j.  
Our design of the R&D phase is rather unique. Because subjects have almost no information 
about the R&D landscape, it is not easy to conjecture behavior ex-ante. As far as we know, 
                                                 
1 Of course, we took care to inhibit negative quantities. If xi(pi, pj) < 0, then pi is changed to ipˆ  such that   0,ˆ jii ppx and  jijj ppxx ,ˆ .  
2 We had to exclude one subject (subject 14) in session 1 from our analysis. This person either completely 
misunderstood the rules of the experiment or tried to undermine it. He chose a prohibitive price of 600 in 
all periods and, consequently, never sold any products. His remaining partner thus could have, and did, 
behave like a monopolist.  
3 Instructions for our experiment are available upon request.  
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there is no unique optimal search rule for such an unknown terrain. The cone structure of the 
landscape, however, helps to mitigate this in case a cone is hit, and local search routines are 
more efficient than pure random search. If we assume that subjects learn that the R&D 
landscape consists of some kind of cone structure, then they should apply some type of local 
search for local optima. In general, however, the non-existence of a clearly optimal behavior 
may strengthen the role of behavioral effects.  
We organize our hypotheses with respect to R&D behavior into three groups of relevant 
factors. One group refers to factors of mere profitability, whereas the others refer to a 
subject’s aspiration level and reinforcement effects. We start with our hypotheses with respect 
to profitability.  
Hypothesis 2: R&D efforts decrease in time.  
The logic behind this hypothesis is rather clear: in later periods, there are fewer periods 
of amortization left so that R&D productivity decreases over time. Accordingly, subjects 
should invest less in R&D.  
Hypothesis 3: R&D efforts decrease with increasing values of product quality z.  
The only information the subjects had with respect to the R&D landscape was that an 
upper bound of z existed. If subjects’ z increases due to successful R&D attempts, the 
magnitude of potential improvements declines. Consequently, the expected value of further 
R&D also declines, so R&D is expected to decrease.  
Aspiration level theory and aspiration adaptation theory have a long and successful 
tradition in behavioral economics (Simon 1955, Sauermann & Selten 1962, Cyert & March 
1963, Selten 1998, Frey & Stutzer 2002) and constitute an important part on the theory of 
“bounded rationality.” They are particularly important with regard to decision making in 
highly uncertain environments. We consider this to be sufficient for inclusion into our list of 
influence factors on R&D. There are two variables that are particularly relevant to the 
formation of aspiration levels and to influencing behavior: product quality and period profits, 
each compared to the competitor’s level. Empirical innovation research has repeatedly 
espoused the existence of neck-to-neck competition effects (e.g., Ahn 2002, Aghion et al. 
2005), meaning that two competitors close to each other are more intensively engaged in 
R&D than competitors with large differences in performance indicators. We believe that 
product quality z is the suitable variable for covering this neck-to-neck competition effect. If 
qualities are close, both players recognize that they may become (stay) quality leader. We 
assume that they indeed aspire to be the supplier with higher quality in such cases.  
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In accordance with aspiration level theory, aspiration levels should differ substantially 
between players in those cases where there are large profit differences. A subject with higher 
period profits will usually be satisfied with such profits and will invest less in further R&D. 
The other duopolist, however, who lags behind and realizes his rival is performing better, will 
usually have greater motivation to invest in R&D.  
Hypothesis 4: R&D efforts increase with the distance of current performance to subjects’ 
aspiration levels, i.e., R&D increases with   
4.1 neck-to-neck competition: the closer the qualities zi and zj are to each other, the more 
both will try to get in front  
4.2 the lag in profits: if subject i lags behind (leads) in actual profits, he wishes to catch 
up to his competitor by investing more in R&D (is satisfied with the current status and 
invests less in R&D).  
Reinforcement learning is a plausible and successful concept in analyzing learning 
behavior. The basic idea is that behavioral strategies are reinforced by their previous payoffs 
(Camerer 2003, 268). Due to their lack of knowledge, the subjects in our experiment cannot 
optimize their R&D investments. Because previous success in R&D is their only source of 
new information, we apply the reinforcement concept to subjects’ R&D learning behavior.  
Hypothesis 5: R&D efforts increase with previous success rates in R&D.  
Finally, we analyze whether there are treatment effects, i.e., whether patents have an 
influence on behavior and whether there are indicators for over- or underinvestment. Given 
that we cannot see a particular reason for over- or underinvestment to occur, we state 
hypothesis 6 as the following:  
Hypothesis 6: There will be neither over- nor underinvestment.  
Patents protect innovations from early imitations and are intended to induce an increase 
in R&D. If they operate in this way, then Hypothesis 7 should be confirmed.  
Hypothesis 7: The introduction of patents increases R&D and product quality for both 
duopolists and increases the patent holder’s profits.  
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4. Results  
Our sample consists of 776 price decisions, 383 in the Basic Treatment and 393 in the Patent 
Treatment.4 Because equilibrium prices depend on both duopolists product qualities, it is 
useful to measure pricing behavior by its relative deviation from equilibrium prices. We 
define relative price deviations of subject i in period t (RPDit) as 
  jtitNE jtit
NE
it
it zzp
zzpp
RPD
,
,  
with pit denoting i’s actual price in period t and pNE(zit,zjt) denoting the corresponding 
equilibrium price. Figure 2 shows a box plot of RPD for different treatments and periods. We 
divided the ten periods into three groups: periods 1-3, 4-7 and 8-10.  
 
Figure 2: Relative price deviations over periods and treatments5 
In both treatments and in all period groups, price deviations are clearly distributed near zero. 
This means that there is no visible over- or underpricing. Furthermore, the interquartile range 
decreases with time, i.e., prices are closer to their equilibrium values in later periods, outliers 
notwithstanding. According to the graphical exposition, equilibrium prices are a good 
predictor of actual prices. Table 1 shows the means and medians of RPD.  
                                                 
4 There are missing values in the data set, if one or both participants of a group don’t choose a price 
within the given time or choose a price over the prohibitive price of the product market.  
5 To provide better visibility of the price distribution, we omitted two outliers with a price deviation of 
more that +100 percent in Figure 2. Both occur in treatment 1, one during periods 1-3 and the other 
during periods 4-7.  
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Treatment Per 1-3 
(Percentages)
Per 4-7 
 
Per 8-10 
Basic Treatment       6.54 
* 
         4.72 ** 
       2.88 
     –0.03 
      –2.09 
      –0,10 
    
Patent Treatment       3.15       0.21 
       6.75 ** 
       1.55 * 
        5.48   
        0.54 ** 
Table 1: means (above) and medians of relative price deviations 
** (*): significantly different from zero at a level of 1 percent (5 percent) 
(Means: t-test; medians: sign-rank test; each test based on subjects’ mean values) 
Although price deviations are close to zero, it can be seen that some of the deviations are 
significantly different from zero. All significant deviations are positive, indicating that there is 
a slight tendency to choose prices above equilibrium values. In summary, we find  
Result 1: Price-setting behavior is close to Nash Equilibrium. Deviations from equilibrium 
are, however, biased towards higher prices.  
The remaining part of our analysis deals with R&D behavior. We previously explained 
that R&D activities in our experiment are costly search efforts in a totally unknown terrain. 
We implemented constant marginal cost of searching. R&D intensity is consequently 
measured by the number of participants’ trials. We estimated several R&D Fixed Effects 
Regression models. One approach includes only those variables that indicate the profitability 
of R&D activities; the second approach covers aspiration level aspects; and the third model 
estimates the impact of reinforcement effects. Finally, we estimated a combined model. Each 
of these models is estimated separately for the Basic Treatment and for the Patent Treatment. 
We also carried out a joint estimation of the combined model. The results of our Fixed Effects 
regressions are presented in Table 2.  
Result 2: R&D efforts decrease with time.  
With increasing time (period numbers) fewer amortization periods remain so that the 
expected value of R&D expenditures decreases. The effect is highly significant in all 
estimations. Even the magnitude of the estimated parameter is quite robust. Hypothesis 2 is 
thus strongly confirmed.  
Result 3: R&D efforts decrease with product quality.  
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of lagged product quality (max_z.L) is negative in all 
estimations, in accordance with hypothesis 3. Note, however, that the impact of quality on 
R&D is significant only in estimations of the Patent Treatment.  
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Insert Table 2 about here. 
Let us now turn to aspiration adaptation theory. To measure neck-to-neck competition, 
we have to define technological distance and technological leadership. We measure the 
technological distance of subject i by Δzi = zi – zj. Subject i is the technology leader if his 
product quality zi is greater than or equal to that of his competitor zj, i.e., Δzi ≥ 0. Otherwise, 
subject i is the technology follower. Neck-to-neck competition then states that the technology 
leader’s R&D should decrease with (lagged) Δzi and that the technology follower’s R&D 
should increase with (lagged) Δzi.  
Result 4: The technology leader’s R&D increases with the magnitude of his lead, Δzi, 
whereas the technology follower’s R&D increases with a decreasing quality gap.  
Table 2 shows that the coefficient for the leader’s Δzi is positive in all estimations. This 
means that a greater lead for the technology leader increases his motivation to conduct 
additional R&D. This result directly contradicts the neck-to-neck hypothesis (Hypothesis 4.1). 
Note, however, that coefficients are significant only in the Patent Treatment.6  
All significant coefficients of follower’s Δzi correspond to estimations of the Patent 
Treatment and they are positive. This fits with the neck-to-neck hypothesis. The insignificant 
coefficients in case of the Basic Treatment, however, are negative. This contradicts 
Hypothesis 4.1. In summary, we find that the neck-to-neck competition hypothesis does not 
work well in our experiment.  
Hypothesis 4.2 states that actual profit differences should impact R&D behavior. Let 
Δπi = πi – πj be the profit difference between subject i and j. We then define subject i to be the 
profit leader (profit follower) if Δπi ≥ 0 (Δπi < 0). According to hypothesis 4.2, the 
corresponding (lagged) regression coefficients should be negative for both the profit leader 
and the profit follower.  
Result 5: The profit leader’s R&D decreases with higher differences in (last period) profits 
(Δprofit_lead.L). In contrast, the profit follower’s R&D increases with increasing profit gaps. 
The coefficients of Δprofit_lead.L in Patent Treatment estimations are significantly 
negative. Coefficients for the Basic Treatment are smaller by a power of ten and are 
insignificantly positive.  
                                                 
6 We believe that this difference in behavior can be explained as follows: the Patent Treatment subjects 
were told that a patent protects the (a,b)-combination given by the subject as well as the twelve nearest 
other (a,b)-combinations. This additional information is a clear indication of the relevance proximity 
within the R&D landscape and may have influenced subjects’ behavior.  
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In case of profit followers, all estimations show a negative coefficient for Δprofit_foll.L, 
which is in accordance with Hypothesis 4.2. Again, however, only the estimated coefficients 
for the Patent Treatment are significantly different from zero. In summary, Hypothesis 4.2 is 
confirmed with respect to the impact of profit differences on R&D behavior.  
Our third type of variable relates to arguments of reinforcement. Hypothesis 5 submits 
that successful R&D breeds further R&D. To quantify this thesis, we define  
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as the success rate of subject i up to (and including) period t. If there are reinforcement 
effects, R&D should increase with SRit. 
Result 6: R&D efforts increase (at a decreasing rate) with previous R&D success rates.  
Table 2 shows that lagged SRit (Success rate.L) is significantly positive whenever it is 
included in the regression equation. However, the relationship between SRit and R&D is 
nonlinear, as the significantly negative coefficients for squared values of SRit (SRit2: Success 
rate2.L) show. Consequently, our data confirm Hypothesis 5. 
One major motivation for the experiment was to determine whether there are any 
indicators for systematic over- or underinvestment in an innovation game with fundamental 
uncertainty. This, however, proved to be a difficult task because the subjects did not have any 
information that made it feasible for them to calculate the expected value of future R&D. 
Additionally, they did not know the distribution of product qualities within, and they did not 
have any information about the cone-structure of the two-dimensional search space. 
Assuming that the subjects learn that there is some systematic structure (a kind of landscape) 
of the quality distribution and that they develop some kind of feeling for the underlying 
function, we first have to define what a reasonable search behavior may look like. As far as 
we know, no optimal search routine exists in a completely unknown search space. Therefore, 
we defined a plausible search procedure that is presented in Figure 3. Having defined this 
routine, we calculated the probability of hitting upon a cone and, given the structure of the 
different cones, the average number of trials it takes to find the local quality maximum on 
each type of cone. Finally, we calculated the expected profit of continuing to search according 
to our search routine, given a player’s actual product quality zi. As long as expected profits are 
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above zero, the search should be sustained. Finally, we derived the critical product quality 
zicrit, providing the maximum value for which a sustained search is profitable.7  
 
Figure 3: A simple search routine 
Table 3 shows the critical values zicrit for periods 1 – 10, which indicate that continuing 
the search is profitable only if zi < zcrit. As expected, zicrit decreases with time. It must be 
noted, however, that the decrease between periods 1 – 7 is rather small. Because the 
experiment ends after ten periods, zicrit declines sharply in periods 8 and 9.  
period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
zcrit 64 64 54 54 54 48 44 29 0 - 
Table 3: Critical (maximum) values of quality zi 
We define R&D behavior to be quasi-rational if subjects search according to this stopping 
rule. Now we can compare the actual search to our prediction of quasi-rationality.  
Result 7: In periods 1 – 7, behavior is not significantly different from quasi-rational R&D. 
However, there is overinvestment within the final three periods.  
                                                 
7 We also carried out a similar calculation for a purely random search. The calculation showed, however, 
that the performance of a purely random search is clearly inferior to the one used in our search routine.  
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Table 4 shows the corresponding data. On one hand, subjects seem to have developed a 
good feeling for when to stop searching. On the other hand, they do not seem to have 
understood the seriousness of the end-period problem, i.e., that further search is only 
worthwhile if they have a sufficient number of remaining periods for the amortization of 
R&D investments. One possible explanation for this overinvestment is that the experiment 
was framed in innovation terminology and that innovation in real life is not restricted by final 
periods. In contrast, firms often have a longer life-span than individuals and are not bound by 
human life expectancy. Consequently, overinvestment in the final periods may be due to our 
artificial construct of a finite time horizon.  
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Basic Treatment 
Underinvestment 0 2 1 3 5 5 7 5 0 0 28 
Quasi-rational search 39 35 36 33 30 23 20 19 20 28 283 
Overinvestment 0 2 2 3 4 11 12 15 19 11 79 
Total 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 390 
Patent Treatment 
Underinvestment 0 1 2 5 7 5 8 3 0 0 31 
Quasi-rational search 40 37 32 32 30 23 18 21 19 21 273 
Overinvestment 0 2 6 3 3 12 14 16 21 19 96 
Total 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 400 
Table 4: Under and overinvestment in R&D (frequencies) 
In summary, we find that Hypothesis 6 does not work well in our experiment. Our last group 
of research questions refers to the impact of patents on behavior. Patents are generally 
understood as a means of increasing the value of innovation. The corresponding increase in 
profits is thought to stimulate R&D investments and, consequently, product quality. We also 
expected this to happen in our experiment (Hypothesis 7).  
Result 8: The introduction of patents increases R&D only in the first periods.  
Table 5 shows the number of R&D trials for different periods and treatments. In the first 
two periods, trials are clearly greater in the Patent Treatment, and this difference is significant 
at a level of 5 percent (U-test). However, the remaining differences are small and 
insignificant.  
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 Treatment 
Period Basic Patent
1 9.77 12.63
2 6.51 9.78
3 6.03 7.80
4 4.31 5.90
5 4.36 4.63
6 3.87 4.23
7 3.36 3.70
8 3.51 3.13
9 2.10 2.90
10 0.79 1.90
All Periods 4.46 5.66
Table 5: R&D trials (means) 
Larger investments in R&D in the Patent Treatment should also result in higher levels 
of product quality. Table 6 shows the corresponding values of product qualities in different 
periods and treatments. Mean product quality in the Patent Treatment is higher in all periods. 
However, none of these differences is statistically significant.  
 Treatment 
Period Basic Patent
1 29.01 33.02
2 36.32 39.72
3 39.14 42.37
4 40.06 44.43
5 42.06 46.87
6 43.66 48.58
7 46.26 48.57
8 47.56 49.77
9 47.87 51.07
10 48.49 52.10
All Periods 42.04 45.65
Table 6: Product quality (means)8 
We conclude: 
Result 9: In all periods, product quality (z) is (insignificantly) higher in the Patent Treatment 
than in the Basic Treatment.  
Surprisingly, subjects earned (insignificantly) higher profits in the Basic Treatment 
(69,016.92 EP) than in the Patent Treatment (64,921.43 EP). This result may be due to the 
comparatively high patent fees of 1,000 EP per period of patent protection. To verify this, we 
                                                 
8 The decrease of product quality in period 7 is due to a new patent that decreases the competitor’s 
product quality.  
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conducted an additional Patent Treatment with patent fees of 100 EP. The corresponding 
average profits (60,616.13 EP) are again lower than in Basic Treatment. Furthermore, the 
lower patent fees do not have a significant effect on the amount of patents. Hence, the patent 
costs cannot explain our results as they pertain to the effects of patents.  
5. Conclusion  
The main objective of our research endeavor is to study R&D and pricing behavior in an 
environment with fundamental uncertainty. We designed a multi-period experiment of 
conducting R&D and pricing one’s own product. Each period consisted of two stages: an 
R&D phase and a pricing stage. Subjects had almost no information about the probabilities of 
R&D success, and they also did not know the demand function when determining their prices. 
We wanted to determine whether behavior in such an environment is close to equilibrium 
pricing and what determines R&D behavior.  
We find that pricing behavior is surprisingly close to subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium 
in both treatments. The provision of little information regarding market data is thus no 
obstacle to near-equilibrium behavior.  
With respect to R&D behavior, we distinguish three groups of determinants. 
Profitability is measured by the remaining number of periods for amortization of R&D 
investments and by the remaining potential for quality improvements. The later investments 
occur, the fewer periods for amortization remain. We therefore conjectured that R&D 
decreases with time. Subjects were told that the maximum product quality in our experiment 
was 100. The higher the current quality, the smaller the potential for further improvements, 
and as a result, R&D was expected to decrease with actual product quality. Both hypotheses 
with respect to profitability are strongly confirmed.  
The second group of determinants refers to aspiration adaptation theory. We define a 
neck-to-neck competition hypothesis, arguing that the closer the duopolists’ product qualities 
are to each other, the more intense the R&D competition will be. In the spirit of satisficing 
theory (Simon 1955), we also hypothesized that the profit leader (follower) will invest less 
(more) if the difference between the duopolists’ profits increases. However, we found little 
evidence for the aspiration adaptation theory. The neck-to-neck hypothesis must be rejected 
completely, and the satisficing hypothesis works well only within the Patent Treatment.  
The third group of determinants refers to reinforcement effects. Because subjects have 
hardly any information about the probabilities of finding higher product qualities, successes in 
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R&D may lead to a more optimistic assessment of R&D opportunities. In this sense, R&D 
success may breed additional R&D. Our data strongly confirm this hypothesis.  
To find evidence for over- or underinvestment, we define the quasi-rational search 
behavior that corresponds to a particular search routine. Note that a precise definition of 
rational search behavior does not exist because subjects do not have any information about the 
R&D success probabilities. One of the major results of our paper is that subjects’ R&D 
behavior fits quite well into our definition of quasi-rational behavior. Again, the nearly 
complete lack of information is no obstacle to sensible behavior. We only find significant 
deviations from our R&D benchmark in the final three periods of the experiment. Subjects 
seemingly underestimate the quantitative effects of the finiteness of the experimental time 
horizon.  
Finally, the introduction of patents has only a minor impact on behavior. R&D spending 
differs significantly only during the first periods. All other conjectured effects appear to be 
insignificant. One possible explanation for this result is that patent fees of 1,000 EP per period 
of patent protection may be too high. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an additional 
Patent Treatment with patent fees of 100 EP and again found no significant effects of patents 
on behavior.  
The main conclusion of our paper is that the subjects’ behavior in the fundamentally 
uncertain environment of our experiment is reasonable. This is particularly true for the 
subjects’ pricing decisions that were close to equilibrium value. Although we do find some 
hints of the existence of behavioral effects, only reinforcement effects are highly significant 
across both treatments and different model specifications. Given these results, our basic 
concern that rational choice models of innovation contradict the very nature of incalculable 
innovation must be qualified: subjects learn how to adapt to rather complex and highly 
uncertain environments remarkably well.  
References  
Aghion, P., N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith, P. Howitt (2005): Competition and 
Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXX, 701–728. 
Ahn, S. (2002): Competition, innovation and productivity growth, OECD Working Paper.  
Arrow, K. (1991): The dynamics of technological change, in: OECD (ed.), Technology and 
Productivity: The Challenge for Economic Policy, Paris, 473-476.  
Beath, J., Y. Katsoulacos, D. Ulph (1989a): The game theoretic analysis of innovation; a 
survey, Bulletin of Economic Research, 42, 163–184. 
 19
Beath, J., Y. Katsoulacos, D. Ulph (1989b): Strategic R&D policy, Economic Journal, 99, 74–
83. 
Breitmoser, Y., J.H.W. Tan, and D.J. Zizzo (2008): Understanding Perpetual R&D Races, 
CeDEx Discussion Paper  
Camerer, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton.  
Cantner, U., W. Güth, A. Nicklisch, T. Weiland (2007): Competition in product design: An 
experiment exploring innovation behavior, Working Paper, University of Jena.  
Cyert, R.M., J.G. March (1963): A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood Cliffs.  
d’Aspremont, C., A. Jacquemin 1988: Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with 
spillovers. American Economic Review, 78, 1133–1137.  
Dasgupta, P., J. Stiglitz (1980): Industrial structure and the nature of innovative activity, 
Economic Journal, 90 (358), 266-293.  
Fischbacher, U. (2007): z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, 
Experimental Economics, 10, 2, 171-178.  
Frey, B.S., A. Stutzer (2002): Happiness and Economics, Princeton and Oxford.  
Geroski, P. A. (1994): Market Structure, Corporate Performance and Innovative Activity, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford.  
Gilbert, R.J., D.M.G. Newbery (1982): Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly, American Economic Review, 72, 514-526.  
Grossman, G., C. Shapiro (1987): Dynamic R&D Competition, Economic Journal, 97, 372–
387. 
Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1987): Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies, 54 
(1), 1-21. 
Heiner, R. (1983): The Origin of Predictable Behavior, American Economic Review, Band 
73, 4, 560–595. 
Hey, J.D., M.D. Reynolds (1991): Experiments, games and economics, in: S. Moss, J. Rae 
(eds.), Artificial Intelligence and Economic Analysis, North Holland, 81-115.  
Isaac, R.M., S.S. Reynolds (1988): Appropriability and market structure in a stochastic 
invention model, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 647-671. 
Isaac, R.M., S.S. Reynolds (1992): Schumpeterian competition in experimental markets, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 17, 59-100.  
Kamien, M.I., E. Muller and I. Zang (1992), Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels, 
American Economic Review, 82, 1293-1306.  
Kamien, M.I., Y. Tauman (1984): The private value of a patent: A game theoretic analysis, 
Journal of Economics, 4, 93-118.  
Kamien, M.I., Y. Tauman (1986): Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-492.  
Katz, M., C. Shapiro (1987): R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, American Economic 
Review, 77, 3, 402–420.  
 20
Katz, M.L., C. Shapiro (1986): How to license intangible property, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 101, 567-590. 
Katz, M.L., C. Shapiro (1987): R&D rivalry with licensing or imitation, American Economic 
Review, 77, 402-420.  
Lee, T., L.L. Wilde (1980): Market Structure and Innovation: A reformulation, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 94, 429-436.  
Levin, R. C., A.K. Klevorick, R.C. Nelson, S.G. Winter (1987): Appropriating the Returns 
from Industrial Research and Development, Brookings papers on economic activity, 783–820. 
Loury, G. (1979), Market Structure and Innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 3, 
395-410.  
Nickel, S. J. (1996): Competition and Corporate Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 
104, 4, 724–746.  
Reinganum, J. (1985): Innovation and Industry Evolution, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
100, 83–99. 
Reinganum, J. (1989): The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion, in: 
R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, I, North-
Holland, 849-908.  
Sacco, D. and A. Schmutzler (2007): The Effects of Competition in Investment Games, 
Working Paper No. 0608, University of Zurich.  
Sauermann, H., 6 Selten, R. (1962). Anspruchsanpassungstheorie der Unternehmung. 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 118, 577-597.  
Sbriglia, P. and J.D. Hey (1994): Experiments in Multi-Stage R&D Competition, Empirical 
Economics, 19, 291-316.  
Selten, R. (1998): Aspiration Adaptation Theory, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 
191–214.  
Simon, H. (1959): Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 
American Economic Review, 49, 3, 253–283.  
Simon, H. (1979): Rational Desicion Making in Business Organizations, American Economic 
Review, 69, 4, 493–513. 
Suetens, S. (2008): Does R&D cooperation facilitate price collusion? An experiment, Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66, 822–836.  
Whitehead, A.N. (1929): The Function of Reason, Boston.  
Zizzo, D. (2002): Racing with uncertainty: A patent race experiment, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 20, 6, 877-902.   
 21
Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of Fixed Effects Regressions  
 22
 
 
